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CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE TOWARDS A HAZARD
OTHER THAN THAT CAUSING INJURY;
RECOMMENDED CHANGES IN APPLICATION
Since about 1850 when negligence-that is, conduct objectively un-
reasonable in light of the foreseeable risk-joined strict liability and
intentionally tortious conduct, there have been three grounds for im-
posing tort liability upon a defendant whose conduct has caused harm
to another. Paralleling the development of negligence as a ground
for liability, the doctrine grew that negligence of the plaintiff con-
tributing to his injury barred his recovery. Perhaps the most
stringent example of the latter bar is the so-called "outlaw rule,"
which prevented plaintiff's recovery if, at the time of the injury, he
was violating a statute., Gradually, however, limitations on the
outlaw rule were imposed as part of a trend indicating general dis-
satisfaction with the absolute defense of contributory negligence. 2
The last clear chance doctrine, the rule that contributory negligence
is a defense to neither actions based upon wilful and wanton reck-
lessness nor to those grounded upon intentionally tortious conduct,
that only advertent contributory negligence bars recovery in strict
liability cases, the proliferation of workman's compensation statutes
abolishing contributory negligence, and the enactment of comparative
negligence legislation, are other manifestations of this discontent.3
One of the more interesting limitations to the contributory negli-
gence defense is the rule that permits a negligent plaintiff to recover
for the ordinary negligence of the defendant, provided that plaintiff
was not negligent towards the hazard that injured him, but towards
another hazard.4 This note traces the development of the "double-
hazard" rule by studying in detail those cases in which it was asserted
to be applicable. For convenience, two aspects of the rule will be kept
separated: (1) what criteria are used to determine whether there
was more than one "hazard," i.e., what is meant by "hazard"?; (2)
what standard is used to determine whether the plaintiff was negligent
towards the hazard that actually injured him? No clear answer to
1. James, Statutory Standards & Negligence in Accident Cases, 11 La. L. Rev.
95, 104-05 (1950).
2. Ibid.
3. See generally Prosser, Torts §§ 51-53 (2d ed. 1955); Leflar, The Declining
Defense of Contributory Negligence, 1 Ark L. Rev. 1 (1947); James, Contributory
Negligence, 62 Yale L.J. 691 (1953).
4. Restatement, Torts § 468 (1934). See also Prosser, op. cit. supra note 3, at
§ 51; James, supra note 3, at 728-29.
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the first question can be expected because the law is still developing.
This note only attempts to disclose the current trend. Solving the
second problem will be difficult because some courts allow a negligent
plaintiff to recover by saying that his negligence was not a "proxi-
mate cause" of his injury,5 while others say simply that the plaintiff
was not negligent towards the hazard that injured him.6 It must be
determined whether this difference in treatment materially affects
the outcome of the cases.
An understanding of the double-hazard rule depends upon a knowl-
edge of the two landmark cases from which it was fashioned. In
Gray & Bell v. Scott,7 plaintiff's child played in defendant's passage-
way despite warnings that he might be injured by equipment moving
through it. He was killed, however, when a coal car fell into the
passageway from defendant's negligently maintained siding above.
The defendant claimed that the child had been contributorily negli-
gent by continuing to play in the passage after the warnings. The
court rejected this argument and asserted the child had been killed
by a risk "entirely different" from that about which he had been
warned, adding that he had had no reason to "expect" danger from
above.8 In Smithwick v. Hall & Upson Co.,9 the plaintiff disregarded
warnings not to work on that part of a slippery platform which
lacked a guard rail. He was injured, however, when a nearby wall
collapsed and knocked him to the ground. Citing the Scott case, the
court rejected defendant's contributory negligence plea and pointed
out that plaintiff had been injured by a "source of danger entirely
different" from that about which he had been warned and of which
he had no "knowledge.'
'0
Considering first the second problem mentioned above, both the
Scott and the Smithwick cases seem to use foreseeability as the
standard for determining whether the plaintiffs had been negligent.
This is indicated by the courts' use of such words as "knowledge"'"
and "expect.'1 2 What criteria were used for determining that there
were two "entirely different" hazards, however, is not so easy a
question. The criterion indicated by the Scott case is the direction
from which the object causing injury comes. If the passageway
5. See, e.g., cases cited in note 14 infra.
6. E.g., Smithwick v. Hall & Upson Co., 59 Conn. 261, 21 Atl. 924 (1890);
Gray & Bell v. Scott, 66 Pa. 345 (1870).
7. 66 Pa. 345 (1870).
8. Id. at 347.
9. 59 Conn. 261, 21 Atl. 924 (1890).
10. Id. at 268, 21 Atl. at 925.
11. Ibid.
12. 66 Pa. at 347.
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had contained tracks, and the child had been warned about being
struck by a coal car, the decision would probably have been the same.
That is to say, it is hardly reasonable to assume the court was dis-
tinguishing between a coal car and some other type of moving
equipment. A coal car falling from above, then, apparently constituted
an "entirely different" risk than one moving down the passageway.
Determining the criterion employed in the Smithwick case is even
more perplexing. The injury in this case was caused by plaintiff's
body falling to the ground. Was the "entirely different" hazard the
way in which the fall was brought about (being knocked down instead
of slipping) or the object precipitating it (the wall instead of the
platform) ? The phrase used by the court, "source of danger,"13
is hardly illuminating.
Following these two landmark cases, the rule was next applied
in a series which can be described generically as "platform cases.' 14
The situation common to all of them was this: the plaintiff stood on
the platform or running board of a moving vehicle which collided
with another vehicle, one of the drivers being negligent. The courts
uniformly held that although the plaintiff was negligent-his position
plus the vehicle's motion created the hazard of falling-his negligence
was unrelated to the hazard of injury from collision.'5 The courts'
creation of two hazards-falling and collision-is logically unac-
ceptable. It is clear that the injury in all of these cases was caused
by falling from a moving vehicle1 Apparently the courts conceived
the separate hazard as being the way in which the fall was pre-
cipitated. The platform cases are also interesting because, following
a chance remark in the Smithwick case, they not only inquired
whether the plaintiff had been negligent according to the foresee-
ability standard, but also questioned whether plaintiff's negligence
was a "proximate cause" of his injury.17 Why it was necessary to
deal with proximate cause after determining that plaintiff was not
negligent was not explained.
The overlapping of the negligence and proximate cause questions
to the ultimate confusion of both is well illustrated in Kinderavich.
13. 59 Conn. at 268, 21 Atl. at 925.
14. Montambault v. Waterbury & Mildale Tramway Co., 98 Conn. 584, 1201
At. 145 (1923); Dewire v. Boston & Maine R.R., 148 Mass. 343, 19 N.E. 52a,
(1889) ; Guile v. Greenberg, 192 Minn. 548, 257 N.W. 649 (1934).
15. Ibid.
16. One is here reminded of the joke which has become a standard among the
airborne infantry: "It's not the fall that hurts you-it's the sudden stop."
17. Montambault v. Waterbury & Mildale Tramway Co., 98 Conn. 584, 589-91,
120 Atl. 145, 147 (1923) ; Dewire v. Boston & Maine R.R., 148 Mass. 343, 347-48,
19 N.E. 523, 525 (1889); Guile v. Greenberg, 192 Minn. 548, 551-53, 257 N.W.
649, 650-51 (1934).
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v. Palmer,"" widely criticized for its application of the double-hazard
rule.19 Plaintiff negligently walked onto a railroad track where an
eastbound train knocked him unconscious and tossed his body onto
a parallel track. Twelve minutes later defendant's westbound train
severed plaintiff's arm. The court held that even if plaintiff was
negligent with respect to the first train, this negligence was not the
proximate cause of his injuries.2o But the court also said that plaintiff
could not have been negligent towards the second train because,
being unconscious, he was not on the track of his own volition.21
Thus the court seemingly conceived of each train as a separate
hazard. It hardly appears likely that the court would have found
plaintiff negligent towards the one hazard of being struck by a train,
but not negligent towards the second hazard of being struck by one
train and propelled into the path of a second.
Finally, in the recent case Furukawa v. Yoshia Ogawa'22 the
concept of "hazard" was given another twist. The defendant owned
a garbage pit enclosed on three sides by concrete retaining walls.
The walls were covered with refuse. While emptying garbage into
defendant's truck, which was parked in the pit, plaintiff slipped
from the wall and fell into the pit, impaling himself on a hook that
protruded upward from the rear fender of the truck. The trial court
applied the double-hazard rule and held that plaintiff was negligent
with respect to standing on the refuse-covered wall, but not with
respect to the hook.23 Plaintiff was permitted to recover damages
suffered because of the hook. Affirming the trial court's judgment,
the appellate court added that plaintiff was not negligent with respect
to the hook because he did not appreciate the amount of danger.24
The trial court here apparently viewed the wall and the hook as two
separate hazards, while the appellate court viewed falling into the
pit as one hazard and falling upon a hook as another. Both courts
seemingly used the foreseeability test to determine whether the
plaintiff had been negligent.
From the preceding discussion it is apparent that the concept
of "hazard" is a vague one at best. No court has ever formulated
criteria for determining whether there was more than one hazard
in a given fact situation. Nor are any criteria clearly discernable
from the facts of the cases applying the double-hazard rule. In
18. 127 Conn. 85, 15 A.2d 83 (1940).
19. E.g., Prosser, Torts § 51, at 286 n.28 (2d ed. 1955).
20. 127 Conn. at 98, 15 A.2d at 89-90.
21. Ibid.
22. 236 F.2d 272 (9th Cir. 1956).
23. Id. at 274 n.2.
24. Id. at 274.
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some, the criterion would seem to be the direction from which the
injuring object comes;25 in some, it would seem to be the way in
which the movement causing injury is precipitated ;26 in others, it
would seem to be the existence of two objects, both capable of pro-
ducing harm but only one of which does ;27 and in at least one case,
the criterion would seem to be the amount of danger foreseeable by
the plaintiff.28 An inquiry into the goal sought to be achieved by the
courts employing it is therefore indicated.
The features common to all of the double-hazard cases are easily
enumerated: (1) plaintiff was negligent; (2) defendant was neg-
ligent; (3) plaintiff was injured during a course of events which,
in some respects and to a greater or lesser degree, was extraordinary.
The aim of the courts in the double-hazard cases also is clear: to
limit the effect of the plaintiffs' negligence. The liability of a de-
fendant for harm in fact caused by his negligent acts is limited by
the doctrine of proximate cause.29 One facet of the proximate cause
doctrine is the rule that the defendant will not be held responsible
for harm that was a sufficiently extraordinary result of his negli-
gence.30 The double-hazard rule appears to be an attempt to give
plaintiffs the benefit of a similar rule since, theoretically at least,
contributory negligence is an absolute bar to recovery31 and, as was
noted above, the sequence of events preceding the injury in all of the
double-hazard cases was to some extent extraordinary.
It is submitted, however, that the method used by the courts to
limit the legal effect of a plaintiff's negligence is both clumsy and
confusing. First of all, it requires the court to find an "entirely
different" risk. There has been no consistency about the criteria
for determining what is a separate risk and the determination is, in
any case, arbitrary. Secondly, the court must then determine that
the plaintiff was not negligent with respect to this second risk. In
order to find no negligence, the court must recite, with varying
amounts of detail, the course of events leading up to the injury and
ask whether this precise course was foreseeable. Two things should
be noted about this procedure: (1) It is not the method ordinarily
25. Gray & Bell v. Scott, 66 Pa. 345 (1870); cf. Kinderavich v. Palmer, 127
Conn. 85, 15 A.2d 83 (1940).
26. "Platform cases," supra note 14. See also Smithwick v. Hall & Upson Co.,
59 Conn. 261, 21 Atl. 924 (1890).
27. Furukawa v. Yoshia Ogawa, 236 F.2d 272 (9th Cir. 1956) (trial court);
Kinderavich v. Palmer, 127 Conn. 85, 15 A.2d 83 (1940).
28. Furukawa v. Yoshia Ogawa, supra note 27 (appellate court).
29. See Restatement, Torts §§ 431, comment d, 435-53 (1934).
30. Id. at § 433(b). See also id. at § 435(2) (Supp. 1948).
31. Within the limitations stated in the text at note 3 supra.
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used for determining whether a person was negligent-that is,
instead of asking "Was the plaintiff acting like a reasonably prudent
person in light of the foreseeable risk?" it substitutes the inquiry,
"Could a reasonably prudent person have foreseen that by working
upon a slippery platform in spite of warnings not to, a nearby wall
would collapse and knock him to the ground?" (2) It is not the
standard applied to determine whether the defendant in the same
case was negligent; the jury thus has two standards of negligence.
Finally, this approach to the problem confounds the questions of
negligence and proximate cause,32 an area in which there is sufficient
confusion at present.
An example of the confusion that can result from the above
process of limiting the effect of a plaintiff's negligence is Cosgrove v.
Shustermacn.33 Here the plaintiff was riding on the running board of
an automobile which collided with another at an intersection; the
plaintiff was crushed between the two cars. After mentioning the
double-hazard rule, the court said that the test of plaintiff's negligence
was whether he ought reasonably to have foreseen the hazard from
which his injury resulted; the rule applied no further than to an-
swer this question.' However, the court then added that if this
question was answered affirmatively, the remaining question would
be, was plaintiff's negligence the proximate cause of his injury?' 5
In explanation, the court said that plaintiff would not be barred for
injuries which were an extraordinary result of his "negligence20
It is difficult, if not impossible, to conceive of a case where a "hazard"
which should have been foreseen could in any sense be extraordinary,
but that is the apparent holding of the Cosgrove case.
In spite of this difficulty, however, the Cosgrove case does indicate
a method of limiting the effect of a plaintiff's negligence while avoid-
ing the objections previously noted to the double-hazard rule as
traditionally employed. It is believed that a better method would
be to determine whether the plaintiff was negligent in the same way
that determination is made about the defendant, viz., in light of the
32. Implicit in this statement is an evaluative acceptance of the view usually
taken by American courts and best exemplified by the dissenting opinion of
Andrews, J., in Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 347, 162 N.E. 99, 101(1928). See also Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 Mich L. Rev. 1 (1953). To be
contrasted is the view taken in Green, Rationale of Proximate Cause, passim
(1927) and Green, Judge and Jury, passim (1930).
33. 129 Conn. 1, 26 A.2d 471 (1942). See also Kryger v. Panaszy, 123 Conn.
353, 196 Atl. 795 (1937).
34. 129 Conn. at 5, 26 A.2d at 473.
35. Ibid.
36. Id. at 7-10, 26 A.2d at 474-75.
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foreseeable risk, was the plaintiff acting as a reasonably prudent
man? If this question is answered negatively, as it would have been
in all of the double-hazard cases, the court could inquire whether
this negligence was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. At
this point, if the court thought the sequence of events connecting
the plaintiff's negligence with his injury was sufficiently unusual, it
could eliminate the legal effect of that negligence. The proposed
method has two advantages over that requiring the creation of an
"entirely different" risk: (1) the standard for determining neg-
ligence is applied consistently to both plaintiffs and defendants;
(2) it permits the courts to limit a plaintiff's responsibility for his
negligent acts in the same manner that they limit a defendant's
responsibility. It should be noted that the proposed solution would
not preclude the courts, in their continuing efforts to circumvent the
contributory negligence defense, from applying different standards
to plaintiffs and defendants in the determination of what is "extra-
ordinary."
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